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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Appellees adopt Appellant's Statement of Jurisdiction.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
First Issue:

Whether the trial court correctly ruled that Davco Management

Company L.C. ("Davco") breached the terms of the promissory notes and trust deeds and
was therefore indebted to Iota LLC ("Iota") and California Benefit, Inc. ("California
Benefit") for deficiency judgments after the non-judicial foreclosure sales?
Standard of Review: This issue encompasses several subsidiary issues. The trial
court's factual determinations are reviewed for clear error only after the party challenging
those determinations has marshaled the evidence.

Commercial Debenture Corp, v.

Amenti Inc., 2010 UT 10, \ 14, 231 P.3d 804, 807. Should this Court reach the issue, the
lower court's determination that the two alleged oral agreements were unenforceable
because they are barred by the statute of frauds is reviewed de novo, but the underlying
facts are reviewed for clear error. Colosmio v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Salt Lake City,
2004 UT App 436, ^ 8, 104 P.3d 646, 651. The trial court's determination that Iota and
California Benefit did not waive their ability to enforce the terms of the promissory notes
and trust deeds is a mixed question of law and fact on which the trial court is given
considerable discretion. Living Scriptures, Inc. v. Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App.
1995). The trial court's rejection of Davco's equitable estoppel argument is a mixed
question of law and fact on which the court is given considerable discretion. Trolley
Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). Finally, the trial
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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court's determination that Davco breached the Iota Deed of Trust is reviewed for plain
error because Davco failed to challenge that determination below. Salt Lake City v.
Ohms, 881 P.2d 844, 847 (Utah 1994).
Second Issue: Whether the trial court correctly held Davco and David Fisher in
contempt for violating its November 4, 2008 Order on Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion for
Order Requiring Rents to be Deposited with the Court ("Ex Parte Order") and awarding
judgment?
Standard of Review: Whether a person has received due process to which the
Constitution entitles him or her when a court enters an order holding him or her in
contempt is a question of law reviewed for correctness. Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82,
\ 25, 100 P.3d 1177. The facts upon Which the trial court relies in making its due process
determination are reviewed for clear error. Id
DETERMINATrVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5^1 (1953)
No estate or interest in real property, other than leases for a term not exceeding one year,
nor any trust or power over or concerning real property or in any manner relating thereto,
shall be created, granted* assigned, surrendered or declared otherwise than by act or
operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the party creating,
granting, assigning, surrendering or declaring the same, or by his lawful agent thereunto
authorized by writing.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-4 (2004)
The following agreements are void unless the agreement, or some note or memorandum
of the agreement, is in writing, signed by the party to be charged with the agreement. . . .
(f) every credit agreement.
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Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-32 (2001)
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a trust deed as provided
in Sections 57-1-23, 57-1-24, and 57-1-27, an action may be commenced to recover the
balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security, and in
that action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of the indebtedness that was
secured by the trust deed, the amount for which the property was sold, and the fair market
value of the property at the date of sale. Before rendering judgment, the court shall find
the fair market value of the property at the date of sale. The court may not render
judgment for more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with
interest, costs, and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceeds the
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action brought under
this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its costs and reasonable
attorney fees incurred.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-301 (2008)
The following acts or omissions in respect to a court or its proceedings are contempts of
the authority of the court; . . . (5) disobedience of any lawful judgment, order or process
of the court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311 (2008)
If an actual loss or injury to a party in an action or special proceeding is caused by the
contempt, the court, in lieu of or in addition to the fine or imprisonment imposed for the
contempt, may order the person proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of
money sufficient to indemnify him and to satisfy his costs and expenses. The order and
the acceptance of money under it is a bar to an action by the aggrieved party for the loss
and injury.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
L

PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
1.

On October 23, 2008, Iota and California Benefit filed a Complaint in the

Fifth Judicial District Court for Washington County against Davco and its managing
member, David Fisher (the "Davco Action"). {See generally R. 1.)
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2.

The Davco Action stated causes of action against Davco for assignment of

rents from both the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments, and causes of action for
declaratory relief against Davco that all rents and payments for the apartment complexes
be made to Iota and California Benefit, The Davco Action also stated a cause of action
against David Fisher for breach of a personal guaranty, and a cause of action against
Davco for an accounting. (SeeR. 12.)
3.

About a week later, Iota and California Benefit filed an Ex Parte Motion for

Order Requiring Rents to Be Deposited with the Court ("Ex Parte Motion"). (See R. 20.)
4.

The Ex Parte Motion requested that the court hold rents and security

deposits collected by Davco during the pendency of the action. (See R. 29-30.) Iota and
California Benefit filed the Ex Parte Motion pursuant to provisions in both the Iota Deed
of Trust and the California Benefit Deed of Trust that required Davco to assign rent and
lease payments to Iota and California Benefit in the event of default. (See Plaintiffs
Trial Exhibit ("PL Tr. Ex. 3, Addendum No. 1 % 10.1; PI. Tr. Ex. 14, Addendum No. 2.)
Iota and California Benefit did not file the Ex Parte Motion pursuant to any provision of
the personal guaranty it believed David Fisher had signed. (See R. 23-32.)
5.

On November 4, 2008, the court granted Iota's and California Benefit's Ex

Parte Motion and ordered, among other things, that Davco and David Fisher deposit all
rents collected from the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments with the trial court.
(See R. 79.)
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6.

Two days later, Iota and California Benefit filed a Notice of Entry of Order,

in which they attached the Ex Parte Order. (See R. 75.) The Notice of Entry, including
the attached Ex Parte Order, was sent to Darwin Fisher, as counsel for Davco and David
Fisher. (See R. 77.) Darwin Fisher did not file an objection on behalf of his clients to the
Ex Parte Order, nor did he move to have the Ex Parte Order set aside. (See R. 82-94.)
7.

About two weeks later (November 12, 2008), Iota and California Benefit

filed an Amended Complaint in the Davco Action. (See generally R. 94-104.) The
Amended Complaint did not name David Fisher as a defendant. (See id.)
8.

Davco filed an Answer and Counterclaim a couple days after that. Davco

did not allege in its Counterclaim that the Ex Parte Order was procured by Iota or
California Benefit by improper means. (See R. 89-94.)
9.

The Ex Parte Order was circulated to the tenants of the apartments, some of

whom deposited $7,400 with the trial court. (R. 368.)
10.

The court entered a Stipulated Order on March 5, 2009, reciting the fact

that the Court entered an Order on Plaintiffs" Ex Parte Motion on November 4, 2008.
The Stipulated Order states that the Order on Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion was no longer
necessary given the foreclosure of the apartment complexes, and, accordingly, ordered
that rents be paid to the record owner of the properties (Iota and California Benefit)
and/or their designated agents. (See R. 78-79.)
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11.

On October 15, 2008, Iota and California Benefit initiated non-judicial

foreclosure proceedings on the two properties while recording Notices of Default.
Trustee's sales occurred on February 20, 2009. Davco did not object or attempt to stop
the foreclosures or the sales from going forward. (R. 1125, 102:17-23.)
12.

Because the bids for the two apartment complexes were insufficient to

satisfy the amounts owing on the promissory notes, Iota and California Benefit filed their
Second Amended Complaint in the Davco Action on May 18, 2009, in which they added
causes of action under Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32, against Davco for deficiency
judgments as to the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments. (See R. 270.)
13.

On October 14, 2009, Iota and California Benefit filed a Motion for Release

of Rents Deposited with the Court ("Motion for Release of Rents"). In the supporting
memorandum, IOTA and California Benefit argued that even with the release of rents
deposited with the court, they believed not all deposits of rent had been received with the
court. The supporting memorandum referenced David Fisher's deposition testimony in
which he admits that he had taken and retained rents subject to the Ex Parte Order. (R.
374-75.)
14.

. ..

•

On December 18, 2009, the parties filed a Pretrial Order. Davco was on

notice that IOTA and California Benefit would be presenting evidence on why Davco and
David Fisher should be held in contempt for failing to abide by the Ex Parte Order. (R.
469.)
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15.

Several months later (April 16, 2010), in Iota and California Benefit's Trial

Brief, they argued that Davco and David Fisher should be held in contempt of court for
failing to comply with the Ex Parte Order—requiring rents to be sent to the court—from
the time that the Order was issued until the trustee's sales were held on February 20,
2009. (SeeR. 551-54.)
16.

On April 21, 2010, Davco filed its Trial Brief. As to whether David Fisher

was in contempt of the Ex Parte Order, Davco argued on behalf of David Fisher that a
contempt proceeding should be held separately, that an affidavit had not been filed, and
that therefore the court lacked jurisdiction to conduct a contempt proceeding. (R. 60001.)
17.

Trial was held on April 26, 27 and 29, 2010. The issue of contempt against

Davco and David Fisher was tried before the court and David Fisher gave testimony on
this issue. (R. 1125,233:21-235:20.)
18.

On May 28, 2010, Iota and California Benefit filed their Post-Trial Brief,

again arguing that Davco and David Fisher should be held in contempt for failing to
deposit rents with the court as required by the Ex Parte Order. At this time, Iota and
California Benefit filed their proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law addressing
contempt. On June 9, 2010, Davco filed its Written Closing Argument, arguing that a
contempt proceeding was improper. (R. 771-74.) At this time, Davco filed its proposed
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findings of fact and conclusions of law which also addressed the contempt issue. (R.
807-08.)
19.

On September 27, 2010, the trial court entered judgments against Davco

and David Fisher. The court ordered Davco to pay $389,43830 (the difference between
the amount owed on the apartment complex and its fair market value) for the deficiency
judgment on the Casa Sonoma Apartments, and $272,266.20 for the deficiency judgment
on the Casa Grande Apartments. In addition, the trial court ordered Davco to pay
$132,844.96 in wrongfully withheld rents and security deposits (to be credited against the
deficiency judgments if paid), and based upon contempt ordered Davco and David Fisher
to pay $71,119.17 for the amount of rents Davco and David Fisher wrongfully collected
between the time Davco and David Fisher received the November 4, 2008 Ex Parte Order
and the February 20, 2009 trustee's sales. (See R. 793 % 14.)
II.

STATEMENT OF FACTS.
(Players)
1.

Richard T. Murset ("Murset") is a managing member of Iota and the Vice

President of California Benefit. (See R. 1125, 32:20-22; 32:26-33:3.)
2.

Iota's principal asset is the Casa Sonoma Apartments located at 669 South

700 East, St. George, Utah. (See R. 1125, 33:20-25.)
3.

California Benefit's principal asset is the Casa Grande Apartments located

at 735 East 700 South, St. George, Utah. (5eeR. 1125, 34:13-17.)
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4.

David Fisher is a member and manager of Davco. (See R. 1125, 225:19-

20.)
(Background)
5.

In 2005, Darcy Thompson, a real estate agent for Murset, and Lori

Muscolino, a real estate agent for David Fisher, attempted to sell the Casa Sonoma and
Casa Grande Apartments to Davco. As part of an August 2005 Real Estate Purchase
Agreement, Murset was to provide to David Fisher profit and loss statements for the
apartment complexes. (See Plaintiffs' Trial Exhibit ("Pi. Tr. Ex.") 63, p. 8, Addendum
No. 3.) Murset provided David Fisher with the requested financial information. (See PL
Tr. Ex. 61, Addendum No. 4.) The 2005 Real Estate Purchase Agreement did not close
because David Fisher was unable to obtain conventional financing. (R. 778 f 10.)
6.

In 2006, Murset and David Fisher, through their same real estate agents,

again began negotiations for Davco to purchase the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande
Apartments with owner financing. Murset provided to David Fisher financial statements
for the apartment complexes from 2002 through May 2006.
181:14-22.)

(R. 1125, 176:11-12;

David Fisher had discussions with Murset over the provided financial

statements, including that some of the financial information was incorrect

(See

Defendants' Trial Exhibits ("D. Tr. Ex.") 3-6, Addendum No. 5;) Murset cooperated
with David Fisher and provided additional information to David Fisher. David Fisher
made purchase offers for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments based upon the
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seventeen months (January 2005 through May 2006) of financial information provided by
Murset to David Fisher. (R. 1125, 181:17-22; 592:13-16.)
7.

The remaining financial information for 2006 could not be provided

because the year 2006 had not been completed. Murset provided his remaining 2006
financial information to David Fisher in February 2007. (R. 1125, 181: 23-24; 183:1013.)
(Casa Sonoma Apartments)
8.

In September of 2006, Davco entered into an agreement with Iota to

purchase the Casa Sonoma Apartments. Even though David Fisher did not have all the
2006 financial information for Casa Sonoma Apartments in September 2006, Davco
chose to close the purchase of the Casa Sonoma Apartments. (PI. Tr. Ex. 62, Addendum
No. 6.)
9.

Later that month, Davco executed a Term Loan Promissory Note in the

principal amount of $1,341,395.00 in favor of Iota (hereinafter referred to as the "Iota
Note"). (R. H255 44:14-20; 45:15-16; PL Tr. Ex. 1, Addendum No. 7.)
10.

The Iota Note provided that the entire balance due and owing on the note be

paid on or before December 1, 2007. (R. 1125:45:24; Addendum No. 7.)
11.

Davco executed a Deed of Trust, Security Agreement Assignment of Rents

and Leases, and Fixture Filing ("Iota Trust Deed") wherein Davco was the trustor and
Iota was the beneficiary. (See Addendum No. 1.)
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12.

The Iota Trust Deed granted to Iota a security interest in the Casa Sonoma

apartments, together with the rents and security deposits. (R. 1125, 50:16-20; Addendum
No. 1.)
13.

Paragraph 8.7 of the Iota Trust Deed provides that Davco shall not sell,

convey or alienate the Casa Sonoma Apartments or any portion thereof, (Addendum No.
i.)
14.

Paragraph 10.1 of the Iota Trust Deed states that if Davco defaults Iota has

the right to collect rents and the tenants are to make payments to Iota. (Addendum No.
6.)
15.

Paragraph 11.1 of the Iota Trust Deed defines an "Event of Default" as the

failure of Davco to perform any term in the trust deed or the promissory note.
(Addendum No. 6.)
16.

There are no written amendments executed by Iota for the Iota Note or the

Iota Trust Deed. (R. 1125:52:14-17.)
17.

Davco did not pay the Iota Note at maturity on December 1, 2007. (R.

1125, 63:10-14.)

Davco thereafter made monthly interest payments to Iota from

December 2007 until August 2008. (R. 1125, 65:23-26).
(Casa Grande Apartments)
18.

In November of 2006, Davco entered into an agreement with California

Benefit to purchase the Casa Grande Apartments. Even though David Fisher did not
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have all the 2006 financial information for the Casa Grande Apartments in November
2006, Davco chose to close the purchase of the Casa Grande Apartments. (R. 592:13-16.)
19.

At the end of that month, Davco executed an All-inclusive Promissory Note

in the principal amount of $2,411,596.00 in favor of California Benefit ("California
Benefit Note"). {See PL Tr. Ex. 13, Addendum No. 8.)
20.

The California Benefit Note provides that the entire balance due and owing

on the note shall be paid on or before December 10, 2007. (R. 1125, 73:6-14.)
21.

Davco executed an All-inclusive Deed of Trust and Assignment of Rents

("California Benefit Trust Deed") wherein Davco was the trustor and California Benefit
was the beneficiary. (Addendum No. 2.)
22.

The California Benefit Trust Deed granted to California Benefit a security

interest in the Casa Grande Apartments, together with the rents, issues and profits.
(Addendum No. 2.)
23.

There are no written amendments executed by California Benefit for the

California Benefit Note or the California Benefit Trust Deed. (1125, 72:17-21.)
24.

Davco did not pay the California Benefit Note at maturity on December 10,

2007. Davco thereafter made monthly interest payments to California Benefit from
December 2007 to August 2008. (R. 1125, 72:22-26.)
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(October 2007 to October 2008)
25.

On October 31, 2007, Davco conveyed the Casa Sonoma Apartments to

Darwin Fisher (R. 1125, 59:10-13.) without notice to or the consent of Iota. Iota would
not have given its consent to these conveyances. (R. 1125, 57:9-16) Darwin Fisher
owned the Casa Sonoma Apartments for one year or until October 7, 2008, when Darwin
Fisher conveyed the Casa Sonoma Apartments to Davco. (See PL Tr. Ex. 8, Addendum
No. 9.) During the time Darwin Fisher owned the Casa Sonoma Apartments, Davco
provided no evidence to Iota of refinancing efforts by Darwin Fisher. (See R. 1125,
58:10-15.)
26.

Starting in November 2007 and through March 2008, David Fisher

contacted Jeff Feltwell, a mortgage broker, to obtain refinancing for the Casa Sonoma
and Casa Grande Apartments. David Fisher provided to Feltwell financing operating
statements for 2007 for the Casa Grande Apartments and a December 21, 2007 credit
report for David Fisher. (SeeR. 1126, 291:1-8; PI. Tr. Ex. 68, Addendum No. 10.)
27.

Feltwell prepared an application to refinance the Casa Grande Apartments

in the name of David Fisher as the owner. Feltwell was not told by David Fisher that
Darwin Fisher was the owner. Feltwell forwarded the applications and information to
two lenders for review. For refinance to occur, the lenders required that David Fisher
have a two-year income stream as the owner of the properties. Feltwell testified that the
prior owner's financial statements for 2005 and 2006 were not required by the lenders
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and under the guidelines were not needed to obtain a loan for the apartment complexes.
(R. 1126,293:21-24.)
28.

The loan application for refinancing for Casa Grande was denied on

February 21, 2008 by the lenders for the following reasons: (1) David Fisher did not
have two years of income stream as the owner; (2) the appraised value of the Casa
Grande Apartments did not come in as high as anticipated based on the December 2007
appraisal of Craig Morley; and (3) David Fisher had credit problems specifically the
December 21, 2007 credit report listed eleven (11) foreclosures. Each of these reasons
led to denial of the loan application for the Casa Grande Apartments. (R. 1126, 294:7-23;
PL Tr. Ex. 65, Addendum No. 11.) Feltwell testified the foreclosures demonstrated
financial mismanagement by David Fisher. Based on the denial of the Casa Grande loan
application, David Fisher withdrew his loan application to obtain refinancing for the Casa
Sonoma Apartments on March 12, 2008. (PL Tr. Ex. 69, Addendum No. 12.)
29.

On March 26, 2008, David Fisher emailed Murset and requested the status

of the 2005 and 2006 year-to-date operating statements for the Casa Sonoma and Casa
Grande Apartments for David Fisher's broker. (See PI. Tr. Ex. 24, Addendum No. 13.)
Murset provided the financial information for 2005 and 2006 to the mortgage broker. (R.
1125,82:12-21.)
30.

About a week later, David Fisher, without notice to or the consent of Iota,

recorded a $500,000 Trust Deed encumbrance against the Casa Sonoma Apartments with
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David Fisher as the trustor and in favor of the beneficiary Fab 5 Management LLC. (R.
1125,- 58:16-21; PL Tf. Ex. 7, Addendum No. 14.) At that time David Fisher did not own
the Casa Sonoma Apartments nor was it owned by Davco. Iota would not have given its
consent to this $500,000 Trust Deed encumbrance. (R. 1125, 60:2-5.)
31.

Seven months after maturity of the Iota and California Benefit Notes, or on

June 3, 2008, Murset requested that Davco refinance the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande
Apartments by the end of July 2008. (R. 1125, 83:26-84:1-2; PL Tr. Ex. 25, Addendum
No. 15.) This request for refinancing by the end of July 2008 was not done by Davco.
(R. 1125, 67:20-21; 84:4-5.)
32.

Toward the end of June 2008, David Fisher emailed Murset stating that he

would have a letter of commitment in seven to ten days for refinancing. The refinancing
never occurred. (R. 1125, 84:15-17; PL Tr. Ex. 26, Addendum No. 16.)
33.

The following month (July 21* 2008), David Fisher emailed Murset stating

the loan officer said that he received the updated financials except for the 2007 returns
which David Fisher's CPA was making a couple of changes and then would be sending
them back to David Fisher for review and forwarding to the loan officer. (PL Tr. Ex. 27,
Addendum No. 17) Again, Davco had the financial information but was unable to
refinance the apartment complexes. (Id.)
34.

On August 25, 2008, Murset requested a deed in lieu of foreclosure from

Davco as a result of Davco ^failure to refinance the apartments. (R. 1125, 86:15-16.)
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The deed in lieu of foreclosure was requested by Murset without knowledge of the actual
ownership of the Casa Sonoma Apartments by Darwin Fisher and without notice of the
recorded $500,000' Fab 5 Trust Deed. Davco rejected the request for a deed in lieu of
foreclosure. (R. 1125, 86:15-17.)
35.

The very next day, David Fisher emailed Murset stating that the lending

institutions were changing their guidelines on the capitalization rate. David Fisher told
Murset that David Fisher would have to bring in money to close since the loan amount
would not be enough to cover the debt. David Fisher wias expecting a settlement on
October 2, 2008, which would be enough to pay the difference between what Davco
owed and the loan amounts. David Fisher also stated that he had two patties interested in
purchasing the properties. David Fisher requested that Davco have enough time for
either one of these things to happen. (R. 1125, 87:7-88:1.) Murset accommodated David
Fisher's request.
36.

On September 3, 2008, Murset then requested payment of additional

consideration from Davco as a result of the failure to refinance the apartments. (R. 1125,
88:12-14.) This request was rejected by Davco.
37.

Five days later, Davco executed September monthly interest payment

checks to Iota and California Benefit and then issued a stop payment order on those
checks. (R. 1125, 89:26-90:5; PI. Tr. Ex: 9, Addendum No. 18.) Davco made no further
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monthly interest payments to Iota mid California Benefit after stopping the September
monthly interest payment checks. (R, 1125,98:12-14.)
38.

The following day, David Fisher for the first time requested from Murset

that Davco be paid for its alleged 2007 improvements to the two apartment complexes.
(R. 1125, 95:5-10.) At this time, Davco had not paid Murset the September monthly
interest payments under the Iota and California Benefit Notes. Iota and California
Benefit refused to pay Davco for its alleged improvements, but rather wanted Davco to
refinance the apartments. (SeeVLTr. Ex. 32, Addendum No. 19.)
39.

Non-payment of the September 2008 monthly interest payments by Davco

to Iota and California Benefit placed Murset in a predicament of having to pay the
monthly senior note obligations against the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments
without any income from the rents or payments on the notes. (R. 1125,98:15-18.)
40.

:

On September 24, 2008, Davco sent a letter to Murset stating, among oilier

things, that it wanted to be paid for the improvements and stating for the first time to
Murset that Iota and California Benefit had previously agreed to a one-year extension
agreement on the Iota and California Benefit Notes. (R. 1125, 94:6-8; PL Tr. Ex. 31,
Addendum No. 20.) The letter fails to notify Murset that the Casa Sonoma Apartments
were owned by David Fisher's father and attorney Darwin Fisher and of the $500,000
Fab 5 Trust Deed, all of which information should have been disclosed to Murset, and
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fails to address Davco's non-payment of the September monthly interest payments to Iota
and California Benefit. (See Addendum No. 20.)
41.

Less than a week later, Murset sent a letter responding to David Fisher's

September 24, 2008 letter denying any one-year extension was made and stating that if an
agreement for a one-year extension had been made then that agreement would have been
honored. (R. 1125, 94:14-17.) Murset also proposed a solution to the dispute which was
rejected by Fisher. (PI. Tr. Ex. 33, Addendum No. 21.)
42.

Between October 3 and October 8, the parties exchanged emails hoping to

resolve their dispute. (PI. Tr. Exs. 34-35, Addendum No. 22.) On October 8, 2008,
Murset emailed David Fisher stating that Davco's failure to address withholding the
September and October monthly interest payments was unacceptable. (R. 1125, 100:4-8;
Addendum No. 22.) In that email, Murset disclosed to David Fisher that Murset had
ordered a foreclosure report and for the first time discovered that the Casa Sonoma
Apartments had been owned by Darwin Fisher since October 2007 and for the first time
discovered the $500,000 Fab 5 Trust Deed against the Casa Sonoma Apartments. David
Fisher responded to Murset's October 8, 2008 email with an email on October 9, 2008
stating that the he had put the apartments in Darwin Fisher's name as another route to try
and obtain financing. As of October 9, 2008, the apartments were titled back in the name
of Davco,

(R. 1125, 100:18-21.)

In his email, David Fisher failed to address the
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$500,000 Fab 5 Trust Deed encumbrance against the Casa Sonoma Apartments.
(Addendum No. 22.)
43.

At the time of Murset's October 8, 2008 email, Davco had not presented to

Iota and California Benefit any letter from a lender stating that it was going to refinance
the apartments. (See R. 1125, 101:6-13.)
44.

As of October 2008, Davco had two years of income stream for the Casa

Sonoma Apartments. By December 2008, Davco had two years of income stream for the
Casa Grande Apartments. (R. 1127, 619:13-20.)
(Rents aiid Security Deposits)
45.

After Davco stopped the September monthly interest payments and made

no further monthly payments from September 1, 2008 until the trustee's sales on
February 20, 2009, Davco and David Fisher exercised self-help and collected the rents
and security deposits from the tenants for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments
and failed to remit any payment of the rents and security deposits to either Iota or
California Benefit. During this time, Davco and David Fisher collected $163,243 in rents
and $30,050 in security deposits for a total income to David Fisher and Davco of
$193,293. After application of credits, the net amount of rents and security deposits
owed by Davco to Iota and California Benefit was $132,844.96.

(PI. Tr. Ex. 80,

Addendum No. 23), David Fisher collected these amounts to reimburse Davco for the
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alleged 2007 improvements made by Davco to the apartments rather than apply the rents
and security deposits towards Davco's debt obligations. (See R. 1125, 228:14-20.)
46.

After service of the Ex Parte Order on November 10, 2008, David Fisher

willfully and knowingly collected $71,119.17 in rents and security deposits to pay
himself back for 2007 improvements until the trustee's sales in February 2009. (R. 1125,
234:15-235:6; 235: 16-20.)
47.

David Fisher testified he still had in his possession security deposits which

he failed to provide to Plaintiffs for payments towards the debt obligations of the Iota and
California Benefit Notes. (R. 1125, 244:13-23.)
48.

Davco's and David Fisher's retention of the rents and security deposits left

Murset with no basis to pay the senior note holders under the Iota and California Benefit
Notes. As a result of the actions of Davco and David Fisher, Murset was left with no
choice but to foreclose the apartment complexes and to commence litigation to recover
the retained rents and security deposits. (Addendum No. 22.)
(Foreclosures and Lawsuit - October 15, 2008 to February 20, 2009)
49.

On October 15, 2008, Iota and California Benefit commenced non-judicial

foreclosures of the Iota and California Benefit Deeds of Trust by filing Notices of Default
with the Washington County Recorder's Office pursuant to the provisions of the deeds of
trust and Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-23, etseq, (R. 1125,102:2-4.)
50.

Davco received copies of the Notices of Default. (Id.)
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51.

Davco did not make payment on the Iota and California Benefit Notes after

receiving the Notices of Default.

Iota and California Benefit then noticed the Casa

Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments for trustee's sales.

(PL Tr. Exs. 11 & 17,

Addendum No. 24.)
52.

The trustee's sales occurred on February 20, 2009, Iota was the successful

bidder for the Casa Sonoma Apartments with a credit bid amount of $934,000 against the
Iota Note. California Benefit was the successful bidder for the Casa Grande apartments
with a credit bid amount of $1,800,000 against the California Benefit Note. Iota and
California Benefit became the owners of the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments
with recording Trustee's Deeds with the Washington County Recorder. (PL Tr. Exs. 12
& 18, Addendum No. 25)
53.

Davco did not object to or attempt to stop the trustee's sales. (R. 1127,

620:2-4.)
54.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma Apartments, the

delinquent debt on the Iota Note was $1,649,438.30. (PL Tr. Ex. 74, Addendum No. 26.)
55.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma Apartments, the fair

market value of the apartments was $1,260,000. (Addendum No. 26.)
56.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Sonoma Apartments, the

deficiency amount owing after applying the fair market value of the Casa Sonoma
Apartments was $389,438.30. (Addendum No. 26.)
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57.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande Apartments, the

delinquent debt on the California Benefit Note was $2,522,266.20. (PL Tr. Ex. 70,
Addendum No. 27.)
58.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande Apartments, the fair

market value of the apartments was $2,250,000. (Addendum No. 27.)
59.

At the time of the trustee's sale for the Casa Grande Apartments* the

deficiency amount owing after applying the fair market value of the Casa Grande
Apartments was $272,266.20. (Addendum No. 27.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Davco's arguments on appeal are unpersuasive. This Court should affirm the
judgments of the trial court and award Iota and California Benefit their attorneys' fees
and costs on appeal.
Davco's attempts to vacate the judgments on appeal fall short. First, Davco has
failed to marshal the evidence in its attempts to overcome the trial court's factual
findings. There is ample evidence to support the trial court's findings that Iota and
California Benefit provided Davco with all the information it had agreed to provide and
that Murset never agreed to extend the maturity dates on the promissory notes for one
year. Second, even if Davco did sufficiently marshal the evidence, neither alleged oral
agreement is enforceable because they both violate the statute of frauds. Third, the trial
court's determination that Iota and California have not waived and are not estopped from
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foreclosing on defaulted promissory notes and trust deeds lie well within its considerable
discretion.
Davco's and David Fisher's attempt to avoid the trial court's contempt judgment is
no more persuasive. Under the terms of the trust deeds, upon default Iota and California
Benefit were entitled to receive the rents and security deposits. After the trial court
expressly ordered Davco and David Fisher, Davco's manager, to deposit rents from the
apartment complexes with the court, David Fisher stated openly in his deposition and
under oath at trial that he had continued to collect and retain rents and security deposits
even though he knew the Ex Parte Order required the rents to be deposited with the court.
It is difficult to imagine a clearer example of violating a court's order. Not only that, but
David Fisher received all the process to which he was entitled before being found in
contempt. That he was not a party to the proceeding when the contempt order was issued
is beside the point. The order applied to Davco and David Fisher, and there is no support
for the proposition that a non-party may not be held in contempt.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT IOTA AND
CALIFORNIA BENEFIT WERE ENTITLED TO DEFICIENCY
JUDGMENTS AGAINST DAVCO.
A.

The District Court Correctly Held that Davco Defaulted on the
Promissory Notes and that Davco Breached the Trust Deeds.

This dispute is far simpler than Davco makes it seem. The trial court based its
decision on three undisputed facts and one (belatedly) disputed fact. First, Davco failed
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to pay the promissory notes for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments in
December 2007 as it had promised in writing it would do. Second, in September 2008
Davco stopped making monthly interest payments on its debts. Third, Davco breached
the Iota Trust Deed by transferring the property to the father of Davco's manager,
attorney Darwin Fisher, and encumbering the property with a $500,000 Trust Deed to
Fab Five Management LLC. And fourth, Davco failed to object to lota's and California
Benefit's non-judicial foreclosure sales on the properties.
Although its arguments come in different colors, the premise of Davco's entire
brief is that Iota and California Benefit should not be allowed to foreclose on properties
that secured two notes on which more than $1.5 million dollars each was owed. Needless
to say, acceptance of Davco's position would portend a sea change in basic property and
foreclosure law.
B.

The District Court Correctly Concluded that Murset Provided Davco
With All the Information Murset had Agreed to Provide,
1.

Davco failed to marshal the evidence to overcome the trial
court's finding of fact.

The bulk of Davco's brief revolves around its assertion that the foreclosure
proceedings were improper because Murset allegedly agreed to provide accurate financial
statements as to the financial performance of the apartment complexes for the years 2005
an4 2006, and had failed to do so. (Opening Br. 19-25; 27-33). There are several
problems with Davco's contentions.

As an initial matter, Davco has insufficiently

marshaled the evidence to prove that the district court's determinations that Murset
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provided Davco with everything he agreed to provide and that Davco decided to proceed
with the deal based on the information Murset provided were erroneous.
Utah courts have "long held that in order to challenge a court's factual findings, an
appellant must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when
viewing it in a light most favorable to the court below." Commercial Debenture Corp. v.
Amenti, Inc., 2010 UT 10 \ 231 P.3d 804, 807. Marshaling the evidence requires more
than "merely present[ing] and rearguing] the . . . evidence presented [by the party] at
trial."1 Wayment v. Howard, 2006 UT 56, \ 14, As the Utah Court of Appeals reiterated
just a few months ago:
In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the
evidence, the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
introduced at trial which supports the very findings the
appellant resists. After constructing this magnificent array of
supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out a fatal
flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be
sufficient to convince the appellate court that the court's
finding resting upon the evidence is clearly erroneous.
Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Hanney, 2011 UT App 213, % 25. The consequences of
failing to marshal the evidence are severe: "Where the appellant fails to marshal the
evidence, we need not consider the challenge to the sufficiency of the findings." Tanner
v. Carter, 2001 UT18 \ 17, 20 P.3d 332, 336.

Notably, that is exactly what Davco did in many of its statements of fact. Statement
Nos. 34, 36, 37, 42, and 55, for example, are all taken from David Fisher's testimony, the
bulk of which was contradicted at trial and eventually rejected by the trial court.
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Here, Davco contends that it was not in default on the notes because Murset orally
promised to provide it with the apartment complexes' accurate financial information for
2005 and 2006 and failed to do so. (Opening Br. 19-25). Davco is wrong for four
independent reasons.
First, Davco is wrong because Davco has failed to marshal the evidence to
overcome the district court's findings: Murset provided Davco with the information
Davco requested before the apartments were purchased in 2006; Davco decided to
proceed with the deal with the information he had available at the time; and Murset
provided the remaining information in early 2007. (R. 1125, 181:17-24; 183:10-13.)
As Davco's brief illustrates (Opening Br, 27-28)* the district court's factual
findings are well supported by the evidence presented at trial. Davco, however, objects
to the court's findings in two ways. First, it notes that the profit and loss statements
contained information regarding other income and expenses. But, contrary to Davco's
point, although this might have made the financial statements overinclusive, it did not
make them inaccurate. Second, Davco complains that the 2006 statements were not
provided until early 2007. But, as the court explained, Davco chose to move forward on
the information it had even though the 2006 statements were not available until 2007.
(&eR. 1125, 181:17-22.)
After cherry-picking trial and deposition testimony in an attempt to demonstrate
its point, Davco then declares that the evidence before the trial court did "not disprove
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Davco's evidence and therefore, is legally insufficient to support the trial court's
finding." (Opening Br. 30.) Davco's statement entirely overlooks the legal standard.
Davco's job on appeal is not to show that the evidence behind the court's finding
disproves or contradicts the evidence Davco thinks supports its theory of the case. Its job
is to show that there is a "fatal flaw in the evidence." Franklin Credit, 2011 UT App
213, ^(| 25. This Davco has not done.
C.

Murset's alleged oral agreement is unenforceable.
1.

The alleged oral agreement violates the statute of frauds.

The second problem with Davco's position is that the agreement to which it refers
is barred by the statute of frauds. Utah law clearly states that "[n]o estate or interest in
real property . . . shall be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared otherwise
than by act or operation of law, or by deed or conveyance in writing subscribed by the
party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same." Utah Code Ann.
§ 25-5-1. The same section commands that a "credit agreement" must be in writing to be
enforceable. Id. § 25-5-4(f). There is little doubt, and Davco does not dispute, that the
promissory notes and the trust deeds fall within the statute of frauds.
Here, Iota and California Benefit and Davco agreed in the 2005 Real Estate
Purchase Contract that Iota and California Benefit would provide profit and loss
statements for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments. But because Davco
proved incapable of acquiring conventional financing, that deal fell through. (R. 778
f 10.) The 2006 REPCs, promissory notes, and trust deeds did not include Iota and
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California Benefit's alleged agreement to provide financial statements for its apartment
complexes.

And the 2006 promissory notes and trust deeds were fully integrated

agreements as they constituted "a final expression of. . . [the] terms of [the] agreement/'
and parol evidence about unwritten oral agreements is inadmissible. Dairies v. Vincent,
2008 UT 51, *f 22 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Even if the 2006 promissory notes and trust deeds were not fully integrated
agreements, the alleged oral agreement to which Davco repeatedly refers is not
enforceable because it was not in writing and was not signed by Iota and California
Benefit and therefore falls outside the statute of frauds. 'The rule is well settled in Utah
that if the original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that
modifies any of the material parts of the original must also satisfy the statute." Eldridge
v. Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243 1j 29, 166 P.3d 639, 648 (quoting Allen v. Kingdon, 723
P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986)). Here, Davco does not dispute that for the 2006 purchases
Murset's alleged agreement to provide the financial statements for 2005 and 2006 is not
found anywhere in the 2006 REPCs, the trust deeds, or the promissory notes. Nor does
Davco dispute that there is any writing executed by either Iota or California Benefit to
satisfy the statute of frauds. Instead, Davco posits that the statute of frauds does not
apply because the alleged oral agreement fits within the partial performance exception to
the statute of frauds. Davco is wrong.
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It is well established that "[t]o meet the part performance exception to the statute
of frauds, the terms of the oral contract must be clear and definite and established by
clear and definite testimony." Bradshaw v. McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 79 (Utah 1982); see
also Holmgren Bros., Inc. v. Ballard, 534 P.2d 611, 614 (Utah 1975) ("The oral contract
and its terms must be clear, definite, mutually understood, and established by clear,
unequivocal and definite testimony, or other evidence of the same quality."). The
agreement to which Davco continually refers falls far short of this requirement. Davco
contends that Murset promised to provide 2005 and 2006 financial statements, but it is
not clear what Davco's obligations were under this new oral agreement. To be sure,
Davco says that in reliance on Murset's alleged promise he continued to maintain and
refurbish the apartments, but what one party chooses to do in reliance on another's
alleged promise falls far short of establishing "clear and definite terms" of an agreement.
And because the terms of the alleged oral agreement were not clear and definite, it was
impossible for Davco's performance of those terms to be clear and definite;
2.

The content or nature of what Murset disclosed to David Fisher
had nothing to do with Davco's inability (or refusal) to perform
its part of the contracts.

The third problem with Davco's position is that Davco has not overcome the
district court's finding that the information Murset provided to Davco was not relevant to
Davco's ability to perform its part of the contracts - payoff in December 2007, payments
from December 2007 to August 2008, and refinancing the properties. According to the
trial court, "Feltwell testified that the prior owner's financial statements for 2005 and
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2006 were not required by the lenders and under the guidelines were not needed to obtain
a loan for the apartment complexes." (R. 782, ^ 33.) In other words, the content of the
information Murset provided to Davco regarding the financial performance of the
apartments had nothing to do with Davco's inability or refusal to perform its part of the
contracts. As the district court explained, Davco's failure to refinance was based on
several reasons: (1) Davco's manager, David Fisher, had serious credit problems,
including eleven foreclosures on his credit report; (2) David Fisher (as the incorrect
applicant for the refinancing) did not have two years of income stream as the owner; (3)
and the appraised value of the Casa Grande Apartments did not come in as high as
anticipated based on the December 2007 appraisal of Craig Morley. (R. 1125, 294:7-23;
Addendum No. 11.) None of these reasons have anything to do with information Murset
did or did not provide to Davco.
3.

The alleged oral agreement lacks consideration.

Finally, the fourth problem with Davco's position is that the oral agreement is not
enforceable because it lacked consideration.

The district court did not address the

question of whether the alleged agreements between Davco and Iota lacked
consideration, but this Court may affirm on any ground apparent from the record. Bailey
v. Bayles, 2002 UT 58,ffi[9-10, 52 P.3d 1158, 1161. It is a bedrock principle of contract
law that in order for a contract modification to be enforceable, "[e]ach party must gain or
lose something by the change. If the benefit or detriment is unilateral, a consideration is
lacking, for . . . doing or undertaking to do only that which one is already under a legal
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obligation to do by his contract is no consideration for another's agreement to do what he
is not already under a legal obligation to do." Herman v. Gordon, 740 P,2d 1346, 1351
n.3 (Utah Ct App. 19S7).
Such is the case here. Davcorepeatedlyargues that in addition to the REPCs3 the
trust deeds, and the promissory notes, Murset orally promised Davco that it would
provide him with the financial information from the two apartment complexes for years
2005 and 2006. (Opening Br. 19-25). But the problem (among others) is that even if
Murset did make such a promise, Davco promised nothing in return. Even under Davco's
version of events (which contradict the district court's finding), Daveo's obligation under
the contracts remained unchanged and, as a result, consideration was lacking and the
alleged oral agreement is unenforceable. Davco says that it refurbished the apartments in
reliance on Murset's promises, but such reliance, even if it was reasonable, entitles Davco
to damages under theories of equity, not contract.
D.

The District Court Correctly Held that Murset Never Agreed .in March
or April 2008 to Extend the Notes' Maturity Dates by One Year.
1.

Davco failed to marshal the evidence to challenge the district
court's finding of fact

Davco has not successfully marshaled the evidence against the trial court's
conclusion that Murset never agreed to extend the maturity dates of the promissory notes
for one year. As mentioned above, Davco has a duty to marshal all the evidence.
Commercial Debenture Corp. v. Ameriti, Inc.,2010 UT 10 f 231 P.3d 804, 807.
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In attempting to marshal the evidence, Davco identifies six pieces of evidence that
support the district court's finding, including Murset's email that such an agreement
never existed, Murset's testimony that he first heard of the extension in September 2008,
and Murset's testimony that he requested a deed in lieu of foreclosure. (Opening Br, 33),
To overcome that finding, Davco points to one piece of evidence: Mr. Thompson's
testimony that Murset told him he had given Davco another year to refinance the
complexes. For one thing, Mr. Thompson's testimony is far less definitive than Davco
lets on. Thompson testified that he "vaguely" remembers such a discussion (R. 1126
272:6-10), that he thought Murset had given Davco "another year" to refinance, (R. 1126
274:2-9) and that he "guess[ed]" Murset and Davco had made such an arrangement. (R.
1126 276:8-10). This hardly sounds like the ironclad agreement Davco thinks existed.
For another, Mr. Thompson's testimony is far from a fatal flaw in the district court's
reasoning and comes nowhere close to demonstrating that the district court's findings
were clearly erroneous.
Perhaps even more problematic is the meager evidence Davco presents that such
an agreement ever existed. All that Davco points to is the far-from-conclusive testimony
of Mr. Thompson about extending the promissory notes for another year. Nothing in the
evidence suggests that Murset and Davco, the two alleged parties to the agreement,
reached a "meeting of the minds" with respect to a one-year extension. Provo City Corp.
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v. Nielson Scott Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979) ("[T]he minds of the parties must
[meet] upon an asserted contract modification.")2.

Even if there was such an agreement, it is barred by the statute
of frauds-

In addition to failing to overcome the district court's finding that Murset never
agreed to a one-year extension on the promissory notes, Davco fails to overcome the
court's legal conclusion that any such agreement is barred by the statute of frauds. As
explained above, an agreement, such as the promissory notes, that are incapable of being
completed in one year, must be in writing. "The rule is well settled in Utah that if the
original agreement is within the statute of frauds, a subsequent agreement that modifies
any of the material parts of the original must also satisfy the statute." Eldridge v.
Farnsworth, 2007 UT App 243 ^f 29, 166 P.3d 639, 648 (quoting Allen v. Kingdon, 723
P.2d 394, 396 (Utah 1986)). Here, Davco points to nothing in writing signed by Iota and
California Benefit to support any such agreement
3.

The alleged agreement lacked consideration.

Even if Murset did tell Mr. Thompson that he planned to give Davco another year
to satisfy the notes, there is no enforceable agreement between Murset and Davco
because any such agreement lacked consideration. As explained above, Davco can point
to nothing in the record—most likely because there is nothing in the record—to suggest
that Davco and Murset reached an agreement to extend the maturity date on the notes for
one year. But even if they did, that agreement would fail for the same reason the other
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alleged agreement failed—it lacked consideration. Murset promised to do something in
addition to what he had already agreed to do, while Davco5s obligations under the trust
deed remained exactly the same. Davco says that it refurbished the apartment complexes
in reliance on Murset's agreements, but nowhere does he allege that the agreements
required him to do so. Without consideration, Murset5 s and Davco's alleged agreement
is unenforceable. Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346, 1351 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
And even if Davco did improve the properties, those improvements belonged to Iota and
California Benefit under the plain terms of the trust deeds. (See Addendum No. 1.)
("[a]ll right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and
to: (1) A l l . . . improvements
E.

" (emphasis added).)

IOTA and California Benefit Did Not Waive Their Ability to Enforce
the Notes.

Contrary to Davco's arguments (Opening Br. 35-36), there is ample support for
the trial court's conclusion that Iota and California Benefit did not waive their right to
foreclose the properties. This Court grants "very broad discretion to the trial court's
application of legal propositions to the facts in waiver cases." Living Scriptures, Inc. v.
Kudlik, 890 P.2d 7, 10 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Living Scriptures, this Court affirmed
the trial court's finding that the right to enforce the contract had not been waived.
Although the landlord had accepted four late rental payments, waiver was not established
because during that time the landlord "made repeated efforts to secure the payments on
time." Id
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Here, Murset also did not sit on his haunches. Although he did not initiate a
foreclosure sale from December 2007 to August 2008, Murset did continually urge upon
Davco and David Fisher the need to obtain refinancing. Murset's efforts to choose the
most cost-effective way to recover his money should not in any way amount to a waiver
of his existing rights under the trust deeds. And to ensure that such conduct did not
amount to a waiver of his rights, Murset expressly bargained for a non-waiver provision
in the loan documents. {See Addendum Nos. 1, 7, 8.) In sum, the court's finding of nonwaiver lies well within its "very broad discretion." Living Scriptures, 890 P.2d at 10.
F.

IQTA's and California Benefit's Arguments are Not Barred by
Equitable Estoppel.

Davco's contention that Iota's and California Benefit's rights are barred by the
doctrine of equitable estoppel (Opening Br. 33-35) also falls short. Equitable estoppel
contains three elements: "(i) a statement, admission, act, or failure to act by one party
inconsistent with a claim later asserted; (ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other
party taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's statement, admission, act, or
failure to act; and (iii) injury to the second party that would result from allowing the first
party to contradict or repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure to act." Nunley
v. Westates Casing Servs., Inc., 989 P.2d 1077, 1088 (Utah 1999). "Similar to the
doctrine of waiver, the determination of equitable estoppel is a highly fact-dependent
question, one that we cannot profitably review de novo in every case because we cannot
hope to work out a coherent statement of the law through a course of such decisions.
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Consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's standard of review on the issue of waiver, we
grant similar broadened discretion to the trial court on the issue of equitable estoppel."
Trolley Square Assocs. v. Nielson, 886 P.2d 61, 65 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); see also
Nunley, 989 P.2d at 1087. Davco has not shown that the trial court abused its discretion
in finding that Davco did not establish equitable estoppel.
First, Davco cannot point to a "statement, admission, act, or failure to act5' on
Iota's or California Benefit's part that is "inconsistent with a claim later asserted."
Davco never argues—because there is no support for it—that Murset said he would not
foreclose on the properties or that he would not seek deficiency judgments or that he
would not seek to recover rents that David Fisher was wrongfully withholding.
Second, even if Iota or California Benefit did make the statements attributed to
them by Davco, Davco still cannot demonstrate that it acted reasonably in relying on
those statements. As is true in all cases of equitable estoppel, for the doctrine to be
invoked a showing must be made that, under the circumstances, the party claiming
estoppel has acted in a reasonable manner." Warren v, Provo City Corp., 838 P.2d 1125,
1130 (Utah 1992). Or, as the Utah Supreme Court elsewhere explained, "[a] party
claiming an estoppel cannot rely on representations or acts . . . if he had the means by
which with reasonable diligence he could ascertain the true situation." Larson v. Wycoff
Co., 624 P.2d 1151, 1155 (Utah 1981). Throughout its brief, Davco argues that it relied
on Murset's alleged agreements when it decided to remodel and refurbish the apartments,
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but Davco does not also allege that its decision to do so was reasonable in light of
Murset's alleged statements.
Third, Davco cannot point to a cognizable injury. In its brief, Davco says that it
was injured in that Iota and California Benefit's actions prevented Davco "from
purchasing [the apartment complexes]." (Opening Br. 35.) Nothing could be further
from the truth. As explained above, several factors, including "the pending foreclosures
against David Fisher and the reduced appraisal value of the properties during this time,"
prevented Davco from "purchasing the apartments." (R. 790-91, f 6; 1126, 294:7-23.)
What's more, Davco's alleged injury makes very little sense. What possible reason
would Iota and California Benefit have for trying to prevent Davco from purchasing the
apartments? After all, having Davco purchase the apartments was the best way for them
to get paid. Finally, there is no evidence in the record to support the proposition that
anything Murset provided or didn't provide had any effect (one way or the other) on
Davco's ability to purchase the apartments. Put simply, after two years Davco could not
find a lender to provide the refinancing. (R. 1125, 85:14-89:14.)
G.

IOTA and California Benefit Did Not Breach the Covenant of Good
Faith and Fair Dealing.

It is well established in Utah that "a covenant of good faith and fair dealing
inheres in most, if not all, contractual relationships." St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. Benedict's
Hosp., 811 P,2d 194, 199 (Utah 1991). But this covenant, universal as it may be, does
nothing more than imply a promise on behalf of each party to the contract "that he will
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not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other party's
right to receive the fruits of the contract." Id.; see also Mark Techs, v. Utah Res. Int%
147 P.3d 509, 512 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (explaining that a party breaches the covenant of
good faith and fair dealing "if he intentionally interferes with the other party's enjoyment
of the benefits of her bargain"). The trial court correctly concluded that neither Iota nor
California Benefit did anything of the sort here. (See R. 790 ^ 5 (finding that the
"financial statements were delivered as requested by Davco," and that, even if they
weren't, "the prior owner's financial records were not required for refinancing")). All
Iota and California Benefit did, in other words, was seek to enforce their contractual
rights. And Utah law makes clear that "there is no 'Violation of the duty of good faith, as
a matter of law, when a party is simply exercising its contractual rights." Heiner v. S.J.
Groves & Sons Co., 790 P.2d 107, 115 (Utah App. 1990).
At bottom, Davco thinks it is entitled to compensation for improvements it made
to the properties. But even if all of its other arguments were valid (which, as Iota and
California Benefit have demonstrated, they are not), Davco would still not be entitled to
the money for its improvements.

As held by the trial court, the value of those

improvements was already taken into account at the trustee's sales. (R. 791«[{9.) In other
words> Davco's deficiency judgments would be larger if not for the improvements it
made to the properties.
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Just as importantly, the written contracts entered into between the parties entitle
Iota and California Benefit to all improvements.

Any improvements made to the

properties become part of the trust estate. Under the Iota Trust Deed, Davco granted Iota
"[a]ll right, title, interest and estate of Trustor, now owned or hereafter acquired, in and
to: (1) All buildings, improvements, renovations, works, structures, facilities, fixtures,
including any future additions to, and improvements and betterments upon . . . ,"
(Addendum No. 1.) (emphasis added). Not only that, but under paragraph 6.2 of the Iota
Trust Deed, Davco is prohibited from claiming set-off or making a demand for payment
in the form of a counterclaim or otherwise for these improvements. (Addendum No. 1.)
H.

Davco's Arguments Pertaining to the Iota Trust Deed Come Too Late,
Are Incorrect and Do Not Matter,

For the first time on appeal, Davco argues that the trial court erred when it held
that Davco had violated the Iota Trust Deed. (Opening Br. 45-47). According to Davco,
it had no opportunity to correct the breach* and its breach was immaterial in any event
because it would not have extinguished Iota's and California Benefit's rights. As this is
the first time Davco has raised this argument, it may not be considered unless the trial
court committed plain error. As the Utah Supreme Court once succinctly put it, to gamer
review of an unraised issue, "[t]he error must be obvious, and it must be harmful." State
v. Anderson, 789 P.2d 27, 29 (Utah 1990). The court's ruling on Davco's breach of the
Iota's trust deed is neither.
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As to obviousness, what is obvious is that Davco violated the Iota Trust Deed.
Paragraph 8.7 of the Iota Trust Deed provides that Davco shall not sell, convey or
alienate the Casa Sonoma Apartments or any portion thereof. (Addendum No. 1.) Davco
twice violated this provision. First, on October 31, 2007, Davco conveyed the Casa
Sonoma Apartments to attorney Darwin Fisher2 (R. 1125, 55:26-56:5) without notice to
or the consent of Iota. Darwin Fisher owned the Casa Sonoma apartments for one year or
until October 7, 2008, when after notice of the wrongful act by Murset, Darwin Fisher
immediately conveyed the Casa Sonoma Apartments back to Davco. Second, on April 1,
2008, David Fisher, without notice to or the consent of Iota, recorded a $500,000 Trust
Deed encumbrance against the Casa Sonoma Apartments with David Fisher as the trustor
and in favor of the beneficiary Fab 5 Management LLC. (R. 1125, 58:16-21.) At that
time David Fisher did not own the Casa Sonoma Apartments nor was it owned by Davco.
Instead, it was owned by attorney Darwin Fisher. Needless to say, both occurrences
violated the express provisions of the Iota Trust Deed. Now, in a new argument, Davco
vehemently contends that these breaches were not material and that they would not have
affected Iota's and California Benefit's interests anyway, but the question of materiality
is inherently fact-specific and is hardly the kind of determination that would depend on
an obvious error. This is especially true where, as here, the Iota Trust Deed was
2

In addition to the obvious familial difficulties, Davco's transfer of the Casa Sonoma
Apartments to attorney Darwin Fisher may implicate Utah Rule of Professional Conduct
3.7, which prohibits an attorney, with exceptions not relevant here, from acting as both
advocate and witness. Utah R. P. Conduct 3.7.
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undoubtedly violated, and the only question is to what extent it would have affected the
non-breaching party.
But even more importantly, the trial court's alleged error did not harm Davco.
The court's judgments would stand regardless of whether Davco breached the trust'deeds*
Davco defaulted on its promissory notes, stopped making interest payments on the notes
and did not try to stop the foreclosures, including the trustee's sales. Utah gives parties
like Iota and California Benefit the right to commence an action to "recover the balance
due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as security." Utah Code Ann.
§ 57-1-32. That is what they did. Whether Davco breached the trust deeds does not affect
that right.
II.

THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY HELD THAT DAVID FISHER
AND DAVCO SHOULD BE HELD IN CONTEMPT FOR VIOLATING
THE COURT'S ORDER.
A.

David Fisher Expressly Admitted that He was Collecting and Keeping
Rents Despite the Court's Order that Such Rents Be Turned Over to
the Court

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-301(5), "disobedience of any lawful
judgment, order or process of the court" is contempt of court. In addition, "any other
unlawful interference with the process or proceedings of a court" is an act or omission
constituting contempt. Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-301(9). The court "may order the person
proceeded against to pay the party aggrieved a sum of money sufficient to indemnify him
and to satisfy his costs and expenses." Utah Code Ann. §78B-6-311. "As a general rule,
in order to prove contempt for failure to comply with a court order it must be shown that
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the person cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to comply, and
intentionally failed or refused to do so." Von Hake v. Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172
(Utah 1988). As demonstrated below, Iota and California Benefit have carried their
burden.
After Davco stopped the September monthly interest payments and made no
further monthly payments from September 1, 2008 until the trustee's sales on February
20, 2009, Davco and David Fisher continued collecting the rents and security deposits
from the tenants for the Casa Sonoma and Casa Grande Apartments and failed to remit
the entire amount of the rents and security deposits to either the trial court or to Iota or
California Benefit. During this time, Davco and David Fisher collected $163,243 in rents
and $30,050 in security deposits for a total income to David Fisher and Davco of
$193,293. After application of credits, the net amount of rents and security deposits
owed by Davco to Iota and California Benefit is $132,844.96. (Addendum No. 22.) As
David Fisher himself explained, he kept the rents to "operate Casa Sonoma and Casa
Grande." (R.410.)
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 67 states that if a party "has in his possession . . .
any money or other thing capable of delivery, which . . . is held by him as trustee for
another party . . . the court may order the same . . . to be deposited in court." In their Ex
Parte Motion, Iota and California Benefit attached the declaration of Murset, in which he
declared under oath that he had demanded the rents be paid to Iota and California Benefit
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as provided by the deeds of trust, but "Davco ha[d] not made any payments to Iota, LLC
[or California Benefit] since August of 2008."

(R. 35, f 9; 36, f 15.)

MursetV

declaration provided the court with authority to order the rents to be deposited with the
court under Rule 67. Moreover, David Fisher's later admission that he was keeping the
rents and security deposits despite the plain language of the trust deeds confirms that the
court acted properly under Rule 67. (R. 409-10.) On November 4, 2008, the court issued
its Ex Parte Order requiring that all rents were to be deposited with the court. David
Fisher, who was then a party to the lawsuit, was served with the Ex Parte Order on
November 10, 2008.
Davco's contention (Opening Br. 44-45) that the court lacked authority to issue its
Ex Parte Order under Rule 67 should be rejected for two reasons. First, Davco lost its
ability to argue the invalidity of the court's Ex Parte Order when it failed to object to the
Order, and then when it later stipulated to the Order. (R. 119-20.) As the Utah Court of
Appeals has explained, "[a] stipulation has all the binding effect of findings of fact and
conclusions of law made by the court upon the evidence." Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App
225, ]f 10, 29 P.3d 676 (quotation and citation omitted). Thus, when attorney Darwin
Fisher stipulated to the court's Ex Parte Order, he admitted on behalf of Davco that that
order was legally valid. Second, even if the court did err under Rule 67, that error was
harmless because Davco's manager, David Fisher, later admitted in his deposition and at
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trial that he was in fact retaining the rents from the apartments that were assigned to Iota
and California Benefit. (R. 409-410.)
Even more troubling, after Davco and David Fisher were served with the Ex Parte
Order on November 10, 2008, David Fisher willfully and knowingly collected
$71,119.17 in rents and security deposits in violation of the Ex Parte Order. (R. 1125,
234:15-235:6.) Fisher's retention of the rents and security deposits lends ample support
to the trial court's conclusion that David Fisher and Davco violated the court's order by
"failing to turn over the rents to the court clerk for further disposition." (R. 793 ^j 14.)
B.

Davco's Attempts to Rebut the Court's. Finding of Contempt Do Not
Withstand Scrutiny,

"A court's authority to sanction contemptuous conduct is both statutory and
inherent," Chen v. Stewart, 2005 UT 68 U 36, 123 P.3d 416, 427. Although a court's
inherent authority to punish contemptuous conduct is cabined by constitutional and
statutory restraints, Utah courts have long held that "a contempt issue is a collateral
matter and as long as the complaining party presents a proper affidavit* a trial court is
justified in considering the issue without undue regard for procedural niceties" Kimball
v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233 If 30, 217 P.3d 733, 746 (emphasis added) (citing Robinson
v. City Court, 112 Utah 36, 185 P.2d 256, 258 (Utah 1947)). The trial court's contempt
order against Davco and David Fisher was proper under the court's statutory and inherent
authority.
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Unsurprisingly, Davco disagrees. In addition to arguing that the trial court lacked
authority to order the apartment complexes' rents deposited with the court, Davco
contends that the contempt order against David Fisher was erroneous because David
Fisher did not receive due process, he was not a party to the proceeding when the
contempt order was issued, and an affidavit setting forth the reasons for finding him in
contempt was not filed with the court. (Opening Brief 40-43.) Each of Davco's
arguments is without merit.
1.

David Fisher Received All the Due Process to Which He Was
Entitled.

"[I]n a prosecution for contempt, not committed in the presence of the court, due
process requires that the person charged be advised of the nature of the action against
him, have assistance of counsel, if requested, have the right to confront witnesses, and
have the right to offer testimony on his behalf." Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1322
(Utah 1982) (per curiam). This process was satisfied here. To begin with, David Fisher,
who was a party to the lawsuit at the time, was served with the Ex Parte Order requiring
Davco and David Fisher to deposit rents with the court. (R. 1125, 234:9-14 <) From
November 4, 2008 forward, therefore, David Fisher knew he was subject to an order of
the court. Even after David Fisher was dropped from the lawsuit, moreover, David
Fisher through his attorney, Darwin Fisher, received repeated notifications that Iota and
California Benefit were seeking to have David Fisher held in contempt for retaining rents
and security deposits in violation of the Ex Parte Order. He was first on notice of
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contempt in Iota's and California Benefit's October 14, 2009 Motion for Release of Rents
Deposited with Court (R. 363.) and then in the December 18, 2009 Pretrial Order. He
was further notified of the contempt in Iota and California Benefit's April 16, 2010 Trial
Brief. (R. 551-54.) Davco addressed the contempt in its April 21, 2010 Trial Brief (R.
600-01.), in its June 9, 2010 Written Closing Argument and in its proposed findings of
fact and conclusions of law. (R. 731-32.) David Fisher knew that contempt was an issue
for trial, and his attorney, Darwin Fisher, was zealously representing his interests. In
short, David Fisher received due process.
2.

A Non-Party May Be Held in Contempt

Nor is there any substance to Davco's contention that David Fisher could not be
held in contempt because he was not a party to the lawsuit when the contempt order was
issued. By its plain terms, the Ex Parte Order required Davco and David Fisher to
deposit rents with the trial court. (R. 73.) When David Fisher disobeyed that Order,
therefore, he was in contempt. It does not matter that he was not a party before the court
at the time the contempt order was issued. The case law and the rules abound with
exceptions to Davco's supposed rule that a person must be a party to be held in contempt,
strongly suggesting that Davco's rule is not a rule at all. See, e.g., Utah Code Ann.
§ 78B-6-301 (noting that attorneys, clerks, sheriffs, and witnesses may be held in
contempt); Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8 % 25, 20 P.3d 307, 314 ("Clearly,
a trial court has the power to hold non-parties in contempt if those parties conspire to
frustrate a lawful order of the court.").
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3.

Iota and California Benefit Filed the Required Affidavit in the
Form of David Fisher's Sworn Deposition Testimony.

Davco argues that David Fisher and Davco could not be held in contempt because
Iota and California Benefit did not C4file an affidavit or an initial pleading setting forth the
alleged acts of contempt" (Opening Br. 40.) Davco9s point appears to be that because
Iota and California Benefit did not file an affidavit, the court's contempt order is invalid.
Davco is wrong because Iota and California Benefit complied with the rule and, perhaps
more importantly, the purpose of the affidavit requirement was fulfilled.
Utah courts have not definitively decided what qualifies as an affidavit for
purposes of the contempt statute. See, e.g., Crank v. Utah Judicial Council, 2001 UT 8,
128 & n.l 1, 20 P.3d 307, 314-15 & n.l 1. But according to Black's Law Dictionary, an
affidavit is "[a] voluntaiy declaration of facts written down and sworn to by the declarant
. . . . " Black's Law Dictionary 62 (8th ed. 2004).
The rents issue began at the outset of the lawsuit with Iota and California Benefit
filing the Ex Parte Motion. (R. 20.) David Fisher admitted in his deposition to taking
and retaining rents in violation of the Ex Parte Order. The court first addressed the issue
in the August 4, 2009 hearing and then in the October 14, 2009 Motion for Release of
Rents Deposited with the Court where David Fisher's deposition testimony was presented
to the court. The December 18, 2009 Pretrial Order clearly identified the contempt issue
against Davco and David Fisher and well before the trial date of April 26, 2010. In its
Trial Brief, Iota and California Benefit wrote four pages of argument as to why David
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Fisher should be held in contempt for violating the Ex Parte Order. The bulk of that
argument was the sworn deposition testimony of David Fisher, in which Fisher admits
that he kept collecting and retaining the rents despite the Ex Parte Order directing him to
deposit those rents with the court. (See R. 551-54.). If David Fisher's sworn deposition
statements do not qualify as an affidavit—"[a] voluntary declaration of facts written
down and sworn to by the declarant"—it is not clear what would qualify. In addition, at
trial, David Fisher testified under oath that he willfully violated the Ex Parte Order (R.
1125,234:15-235:6.).
Even if David Fisher's testimony does not qualify as an affidavit, lota's and
California Benefit's argument satisfied the statutory requirements because it "set[] forth
the acts done or omitted that form the factual basis for the contempt charge." Khan v.
Khan, 921 P.2d 466, 469 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). After all, Utah courts have long
recognized that the sole purpose of the affidavit is "to ensure compliance with the Due
Process requirement of adequate and timely notice of the charges made against the
alleged contemnor." Id at 468-69. And as explained above, David Fisher received all
the process to which he was entitled and more.
4.

David Fisher's Objections to the Court's Ex Parte Order are
Rendered Moot by His Stipulation.

Davco's objections to the Ex Parte Order and the contempt finding are further
groundless because Davco, David Fisher, and Darwin Fisher stipulated to the Order. The
court entered a Stipulated Order on March 5, 2009, reciting the fact that the Court entered
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an Order on Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion on November 4, 2008. (R. 117-20.) The
Stipulated Order states that the Order on Plaintiffs' Ex Parte Motion is no longer
necessary given the foreclosure of the apartment complexes, and, accordingly, orders that
rents be paid to the record owner of the properties (Iota arid California Benefit) and/or
their designated agents. (See id.) It is well established that "[a] stipulation has all the
binding effect of findings of fact and conclusions of law made by the court upon the
evidence. The rationale is that the stipulation constitutes an agreement of the parties that
all the facts necessary to support it. . . pre-existed and would be sustained by available
evidence, had not the agreement of the parties dispensed with the taking of evidence."
Davis v. Davis, 2001 UT App 225, f 10, 29 P.3d 676 (quotation and citation omitted).
For this reason, parties are bound by their stipulations unless relieved therefrom by the
court. First ofDenver Mortgage Investors v. CNZundel, 600 P.2d 521, 527 (Utah 1979);
see also Bennett v. Bennett, 2005 UT App 528, 528 (Dec. 8, 2005) (per curiam)
(unpublished) (Addendum No. 31). Attorney Darwin Fisher's stipulation has the same
effect here.
III.

IOTA AND CALIFORNIA BENEFIT ARE ENTITLED TO THEIR
ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS FOR DEFENDING THIS APPEAL,
According to Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9), "[a] party seeking to recover attorney fees

incurred on appeal shall state the request explicitly and set forth the legal basis for such
an award." Below, lota and California Benefit prevailed in two respects. First, Iota and
California Benefit established that they were entitled to deficiency judgments under Utah
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Code Ann. § 57-1-32. Second, they established that Davco and David Fisher were in
contempt of the trial court's order under Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-311. Section 57-1-32
provides for the recovery of attorney fees and costs for the prevailing party. Section 78B6-311 provides for the recovery of costs and expenses. As for attorney fees on appeal,
Utah law is well established that where a "party entitled to attorney fees below prevails
on appeal, award of attorney fees on appeal is proper." Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower,
959 P.2d 115, 120 (Utah 1998).
CONCLUSION
Davco's attempts to obscure the real issues in this appeal should be ignored. The
trial court was correct in its findings of fact and conclusions of law and its judgments
should be affirmed. Iota and California Benefit should be awarded their attorney fees and
costs.
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2011.

D. VEASY
DAVID R. HALL
ALAN S. MOURITSEN
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Appellees
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